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Abstract. In secure multiparty computation, a set of mutually mistrusting players engage in a
protocol to compute an arbitrary, publicly known polynomial-sized function of the party’s pri-
vate inputs, in a way that does not reveal (to an adversary controlling some of the players) any
knowledge about the remaining inputs, beyond what can be deduced from the obtained output(s).
Since its introduction by Yao [39], and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [29], this powerful
paradigm has received a lot of attention. All throughout, however, very little attention has been
given to the privacy of the players’ outputs. Yet, disclosure of (part of) the output(s) may have
serious consequences for the overall security of the application e.g., when the computed output
is a secret key; or when the evaluation of the function is part of a larger computation, so that the
function’s output(s) will be used as input(s) in the next phase.
In this work, we deﬁne the notion of private-output multiparty computation. This newly revised
notion encompasses (as a particular case) the classical deﬁnition and allows a set of players to
jointly compute the output of a common function in such a way that the execution of the protocol
reveals no information (to an adversary controlling some of the players) about (some part of) the
outputs (other than what follows from the description of the function itself). Next, we formally
verify that basically no function can be output-privately computed in the presence of an adversary
who gets full access to the internal memory of the corrupted players. However, if one restricts the
(computationally bounded) adversary to control only part of the state of corrupted players, any
function can be output-privately computed, assuming that enhanced trapdoor permutations exist
and that public communication channels are available. Moreover, we prove security is preserved
under sequential composition.
We note that partial access to the internal state of some of the players (either part of the time e.g.,
forward-security and intrusion-resiliency, or part of the space, e.g., secure CPU/memory) is an
assumption that has been used in various settings to formalize limits on the attacker’s capabili-
ties that can be enforced via reasonable physical and architectural restrictions. However, previous
models were devised for speciﬁc cryptographic tasks (e.g., encryption and signature schemes),
whereas our formalization has a wider scope. We believe that the model we suggest may fos-
ter further studies of insider adversaries with partial control in the context of secure multiparty
computation.
1 Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) [39,29] allows a set of mutually mistrusting parties to jointly
compute a function, while keeping their inputs private. The MPC paradigm allows many settings and
concerns to be modeled, and thus it is a strong tool in showing that solutions exist to very general
cryptographic problems (cf. e.g., [29,3,14,15,10,27]). The power of the framework stems from the
fact that under corruption of some of the parties (according to various settings and constraints) it is
possible to compile any polynomial sized function into a protocol that maintains input privacy. In
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(memory) of corrupted parties (passive adversary) and one that in addition may control the corrupted
parties’ memory arbitrarily (malicious adversary).
Let us brieﬂy recall just some of the settings considered in the literature. A basic distinction is
between the computational setting [29] where all communication between the parties is visible to the
adversary, and the information-theoretic one [3,14,38], where point-to-point communication links are
completely protected, but the adversary is not restricted to probabilistic polynomial time. An orthog-
onal distinction is regarding static vs. adaptive corruption [10], whereas other directions investigate
different classes of possible adversaries [32,19,7] or extended security notions [38,11,23,37,2,8].
MOTIVATION. In all the above ﬂavors, the deﬁnition of secure MPC guarantees that no information
on the inputs is leaked to the adversary. In other words, the privacy concern (cf. e.g. [15,1]) is about
the parties’ inputs, and no assurance is directly provided about the conﬁdentiality of the output(s).
Disclosure of (part of) the output(s) may indeed have serious consequences on the overall security of
the application e.g., when the computed output is a secret key; or when the evaluation of the function
is part of a larger computation, so that the function’s output(s) will be used as input(s) in the next
phase; or if there is a need to reveal the output only at a certain point locally by a participant, in “real
time,” and not before.
One could think that a simple way to provide output-privacy (with respect to some adversary)
would be to compute the given function using standard multiparty computation techniques, but forcing
the players to keep the output “distributed” among them all. Then, when the output is needed, the
parties would privately exchange their “shares” (by means of encryption) and locally reconstruct the
global output. This would seemingly protect against outsider adversaries, i.e., adversaries who are
only allowed to monitor the communication among the players.
Such ad-hoc solution, however, dodges the problem, rather than solving it. In particular, how can
we prove that this is “secure” if current deﬁnitions of secure function evaluation do not model the
security concerns that we want to address? How could protocols resulting from the above approach
be composed, when the output is required to be at the same time secure and locally (rather than
distributedly) available?
On the other hand, a more structured approach would clearly be preferable, possibly addressing
issues of protocol composition, and encompassing more powerful adversaries who can exert some
form of “active” control on the protocol participants. Though this is mostly a deﬁnitional effort, we
believe that shedding light on the conditions under which privacy of the output(s) can be attained is
important to improve our understanding of a central cryptographic tool such as MPC.
Postulating a limitation on the kind of control that the adversary can obtain on corrupted parties is
akin in spirit to physical assumptions, such as the use of smart-cards and tamper-proof memory. The-
oretical modeling and formal treatment of the issue of protected and tamper-proof storage (and not
merely the more traditional protected communication lines) is a recent area of research, motivated by
the advances in hardware technology and computer architectures. Reliance on some form of tamper-
resistant hardware has been formally investigated in recent work, e.g., the use of self-destructing capa-
bilities for algorithmic tamper-proof security [26], of physical envelopes for collusion-free protocols
[34,35,36], and of secure IPSec cards in “bump-in-the-wire” conﬁguration [31].
THE PROBLEM, A NEW MODEL AND OUR RESULTS. This paper aims to answer the following
question: Is it possible to provide a framework for multiparty computation where concerns of conﬁ-
dentiality of the output can be properly expressed in the syntax of the functionality, and addressed in
the deﬁnition of security? A ﬁrst difﬁculty arises from the fact that, for some functionalities, (part of)
the output of one player may coincide with that of other players. For correctness, a secure protocol
should then guarantee that this is actually the case. This implies that the corruption of one player
might reveal, to the corrupting adversary, (part of) of the output of all players. Intuitively, this makes
the notion of output-privacy hard to capture. For the sake of concreteness, in this work we will con-
sider scenarios in which the concerns of conﬁdentiality are focused on such common output, which
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tended model will then provide privacy of the global output, whereas local outputs (i.e., the part of
each party’s output which is not common to all players) will be protected only to the (limited) extent
guaranteed by the classical setting.
The main technical hurdle toward a satisfactory deﬁnition of private-output multiparty computation
lies in that conﬁdentiality of the global output cannot seemingly be achieved with respect to traditional
active adversaries i.e., adversaries with total control over the behavior of (some of the) players. This
is because, for correctness, each party should obtain the same global output at the end of a run of the
protocol:thispartoftheoutputisthusavailabletotheadversary,assoonasaplayeriscorrupted.Thus,
a good deﬁnition of private-output multiparty computation should be strict enough to encompass this
issue, but also sufﬁciently general to leave room for “interesting” adversaries to consider.
Thesameintuitionbehindthisimpossibilityissuesuggeststhatachievingprivate-outputsecurityfor
the case of outsider (i.e. eavesdropping) adversaries may be feasible. In practice, however, security
against this kind of adversaries cannot be deemed sufﬁcient. Consequently, an important issue to
investigate is to determine the highest attainable level of protection. To do so, the most natural thing
is to consider adversaries having limited corrupting power, and then progressively increase the level
of control that the adversary can exert over controlled parties as much as possible, without falling
into a plain impossibility. We note that settings with partial corruption (either part of the time e.g.,
forward-security [4] and key-insulation [18], or part of the space, e.g., secure CPU/memory [26])
have been considered in many situations in the past for speciﬁc cryptographic tasks (e.g., encryption
and signature schemes), but not for general MPC.
To formalize a proper level of “limited corrupting power,” we move from the following observation.
Whenever the adversary corrupts a player, the available information, namely its input, its random
coins, and the messages exchanged with the other parties, are already enough to derive the value of
the global output. Hence, to there be any hope of protecting such value, the power of the adversary
must be reduced by postulating that it cannot access (part of) these three quantities, even for the
corrupted players.
Since communication among the parties occurs over an insecure network, removing the received
messages from the adversary’s view seems too strong an assumption. Similarly, the party’s input is
often decided by a higher-level protocol, and so it is quite likely to be known to the adversary.
Thus, the most natural way to restrict the view that the adversary can obtain by corrupting parties
is to provide her with parties’ inputs, along with all the messages exchanged with the other parties,
while limiting her access to the controlled parties’ randomness and outputs (which, in practice can be
produced by a tamper-proof device at the user’s computing environment).
Establishing how and when to limit the adversary’s access to this randomness leads to new classes
of adversaries of increasing capabilities (i.e., the more randomness the adversary is allowed to ac-
cess, the more powerful she is). Furthermore, this allows us to prove the strongest possible feasibility
result. Informally, we prove that, under the assumption that enhanced trapdoor permutations exist,
every function is output-privately computable even in the presence of an adversary with, basically, the
sole restriction that she cannot see the global output computed by the players. In light of the above
mentioned impossibility (which we formally verify), our result is optimal in the sense that it is the
strongest attainable feasibility result.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Let ` be a security parameter. In the following we denote with N the set of natural integers and with
R+ the set of positive real numbers. We say that a function negl : N → R+ is negligible if for
every polynomial p(`) there exists an `0 ∈ N s.t. for all ` > `0, negl(`) ≤ 1/p(`). PPT stands for
Probabilistic Polynomial Time. If A is a PPT algorithm, we write x
r ← A(y) to denote that x is
obtained by running A on input y. (We omit the ‘r’ when A is deterministic.) If S is a set, we denote
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r ← S the process of sampling x from S uniformly at random, and by x
D ← S the process of
sampling x from S according to a given (efﬁciently samplable) distribution D.
2.2 Global-Output Multi-party Functionalities
In the standard multi-party scenario, the goal is to realize functionalities that, given the security pa-
rameter, the inputs of the n parties and the random coins, return n (possibly different) outputs, one for
each participant. In the case of global-output multi-party computation, instead, functionalities have a
global output, which should be obtained by all the parties but at the same time ought to remain secret
to the adversary, along with n local outputs, one for each participant:
Deﬁnition 1 (Global-Output Multi-party Functionality). A Global-Output Multi-party Function-
ality is a functionality of the form:
f : N × ({0,1}∗)n × {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ × ({0,1}∗)n.
We are interested in functions that are computable in time that is polynomial in the security param-
eter. In particular, all inputs, as well as the global and local outputs, have length polynomial in the
security parameter. We denote the local input of party Pi with xi, and we let − → x . = (x1,...,xn). Also,
f0(− → x ) denotes the global output, while fi(− → x ) denotes the local outputs of party Pi.
2.3 Non-trivial Global-Output Multi-party Functionalities
Intuitively, a global-output multi-party functionality is non-trivial, with respect to a given distribution
D, if the global output of the function (on an input sampled from the given distribution D) is not
entirely determined by the speciﬁcation of the function and of the distribution. The notion of non-
trivial global-output multi-party function can be extended in a natural way, to the notion of t-non-
trivial function, for which up to t inputs do not fully determine the output. The informal deﬁnition
requires that no adversary, controlling up to t inputs and seeing the corresponding local outputs, can
infer the value of the global output (see appendix A for a formal deﬁnition and a discussion about it).
In this paper, we consider protocols to compute global-output multi-party functions that are non-
trivial with respect to the probability distribution used in the higher-level protocol to sample the play-
ers’ inputs. In particular, and unless otherwise speciﬁed, by saying that a protocol π computes a
(global-output multi-party) function f, we mean that π computes a global-output multi-party function
f which is t-non-trivial (for some value of t) with respect to some probability distribution D. (The
exact value of t and the precise probability distribution D can additionally be speciﬁed if necessary.)
3 A Model for Private-Output Computation: The Two-Party Case
Our security deﬁnitions follow the real vs. ideal methodology, similarly to the case of standard mul-
tiparty computation (cf. e.g. [7]). Loosely speaking, such approach consists of three steps. First, one
formalizes the notion of “real world” execution of a protocol. Second, an idealized computational
process is deﬁned in such a way that its security is immediately apparent. Finally, to prove a protocol
secure, one shows that its execution in the real world is just as “safe” as running the idealized process.
In contrast to standard two-party computation, in our context we are interested in guaranteeing the
privacy of the global output of the functionality. To this end, the idea is to deﬁne real/ideal models
and real/ideal adversaries as close as possible to their counterparts in the standard two-party setting,
while at the same time ensuring that an adversary with (partial) control over one of the parties cannot
extract information about the function’s global output from the protocol.
3.1 The Real Model: Overview
Before presenting our deﬁnitions of real-model protocols and their execution, we start with a mo-
tivating discussion about the types of attacks on the system that secure protocols should be able to
withstand.
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ticated but not private.1 Consequently, the weakest adversarial behavior considered in the literature
consists of passively monitoring the network, without access neither to the two parties’ inputs nor
to their (local/global) outputs (eavesdropping adversary). A more powerful adversary is captured by
the so-called honest-but-curious or semi-honest model, in which the adversary is still passive, but has
complete access to the internal state of one of the parties. In the augmented semi-honest model, the
adversary can additionally change the input and outputs of one of the parties, whereas in the active
model the adversary has complete control over the corrupted party, so that in particular her interaction
with the other, honest party does not necessarily follow the prescribed protocol.
Classifying the adversaries. Whereas the eavesdropping adversary models an outsider attack, all
the other adversarial behaviors are instances of insider attacks. Clearly, output-privacy is impossible
under any form of insider attack, since the adversary can just wait for an honest execution of the
protocol to complete, and then read the resulting global output off the memory of the corrupted party.
In other words, the traditional classiﬁcation of adversaries is too restrictive for deﬁning a notion of
output-privacy in two-party computation.
At a closer look, the inadequacy of traditional corruption models stems from more fundamental
considerations. In the case of global-output functionalities, which provide a common output to both
parties, it is natural to assume that each party holds a certain level of trust on the other party (e.g., that
they are both interested in obtaining the correct outcome). However, such trust refers to the human
being “on the other side of the line,” and not to his/her computing environment. In particular, given
the frequency and scale of worm and virus infections that afﬂict our computing systems nowadays,
placing complete trust in the computing platform of anybody, no matter how trustworthy he/she may
be as a person, is (at the very least) a very dangerous leap of faith.
To go beyond the “all-or-nothing” nature of traditional corruption models, we therefore suggest to
take a more comprehensive look at the context in which the computation prescribed by the two-party
protocol takes place, and try to derive a more detailed model capturing how a two-party protocol is
carried out.
Components of a protocol. The outermost layer is the application context, which provides the input
and is supposed to obtain the local and global outputs, as computed by the two-party protocol. The
application context more or less corresponds to what is called the “environment” in the Universally
Composable (UC) framework [8] (although in this work we only consider sequential composition of
protocols).
The actual code implementing the two-party protocol (what we call a strategy in Section 3.2 below)
is split into two well separated Turing machines: the driver and the secure device. Roughly speaking,
the driver implements the high-level logic of the protocol, whereas the secure device is a piece of
tamper-resistant hardware with limited capabilities, that carries out only the most sensitive computa-
tions related to the global output.
In our model, we see the secure device as part of the party’s trusted computing base: in other words,
we assume it to be bug-free, and fully complaint to its speciﬁcation. Clearly, a necessary precondition
for such assumption to be fulﬁlled is that the actual amount of code within the secure device ought to
be as small as possible: otherwise, it would be unfeasible to subject the secure device to a thorough
veriﬁcation required to establish its correctness. The driver, on the other hand, can conceivably be a
much larger piece of software, with plenty of frills and added features, which interacts with the secure
device to implement the prescribed functionality.
Theexecutionofthedriver’scodedoesnotoccurimmediatelywithintheapplicationcontext;rather,
its interaction with the application context is mediated by the control wrapper. The control wrapper
gets the input from the application context, and provides a (possibly altered) value as input to the
1 The recent work of [2] is an exception, but their approach cannot provide agreement, which instead is inherent
in the context of global-output functionalities.
5driver; at the end of the driver’s execution, the control wrapper receives the local output from the
driver, and forwards a (possibly altered) value as local output to the application context. The global
output, however, is communicated by the secure device directly to the application context, and is thus
never known to the control wrapper.
The control wrapper is also involved in the communication between the two parties in that the
interaction between the two corresponding drivers is in fact carried out by the associated control
wrappers.Sinceweareassumingtheavailabilityofauthenticatedchannels,thecontrolwrappercannot
alter the content of such messages; it can, however, drop them, effectively causing the execution of
the protocol to abort.
Overall, the capabilities of the control wrapper amount to: 1) altering the input, possibly based on
the value provided by the application context; 2) altering the local output, possibly based on the value
computed by the driver; and 3) stopping the execution of the protocol at any point.
Modeling adversaries. The control wrapper aims at modeling the role that, in a real-life deployment,
is played by the mechanism used within the application to invoke crypto library code (which is rep-
resented by the driver). Under normal circumstances, the control wrapper is just a dummy interface,
that simply relays the values that it receives back and forth. However, by exploiting bugs in the sys-
tem, a piece of malicious software (like a virus) could successfully subvert such mechanism (e.g., by
overwriting the entry point for the library function in the appropriate system table), and manage to
intercept the communication between the application and the library code. It is thus reasonable to con-
sider “partial” insider adversaries who are able to take over the control wrapper. We refer to this kind
of adversary as input-/output-controlling, communication-halting; it closely resembles the augmented
semi-honest model (cf. e.g., [28, Chap. 7]).
A more sophisticated attack could conceivably replace the code for the driver altogether (rather
than just intercepting all of its communication as described above). We refer to this kind of adversary
as state-controlling. We ﬁnd it reasonable to distinguish such kind of attack from the previous one,
basically for the same reason that justiﬁes the distinction between augmented semi-honest and mali-
cious behavior for the (standard) two-party case: namely, the latter kind of attacks are more difﬁcult
to mount, for they require a deeper understanding of the details of the two-party protocol. Notice,
however, that the state-controlling adversary is still restricted to use the interface provided by the
tamper-resistant secure device, as speciﬁed by the protocol. Such restrictions are dropped for the case
of active adversary, which obtains full control over the corrupted party. The active adversary is meant
to represent a type of attack stronger than what any virus can mount, in that it can even break the
tamper-resistance of the secure device.
We remark here that such distinction between state-controlling and active adversaries is only mean-
ingful assuming that each secure devices embeds some kind of randomness (e.g., cryptographic keys)
which is certiﬁed by a common Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). Indeed, if the operation of the se-
cure device were only based on uncertiﬁed randomness, a state-controlling adversary in control of
the driver could just never invoke the secure device, and instead pick some fresh randomness and
(perfectly) simulate the execution of the secure device, according to its publicly speciﬁed capabili-
ties. Without a PKI to certify the randomness used within each secure device, the other party would
have no way to notice the deceit. Therefore, by just interacting with the other party according to the
protocol, the state-controlling adversary would eventually obtain the global output, exactly as the real
secure device would.2
The new classiﬁcation. To summarize, we suggest the following types of adversaries (in order of
increasing powers):
2 In the absence of a PKI, the only difference between the state-controlling and the active adversaries would
be that the former cannot cause the real secure device to output a wrong value, but this is immaterial for the
security guarantees that we want.
61. eavesdropping: can only eavesdrop the communication between the two honest parties;
2. input-/output-controlling, communication-halting: can alter the input to the corrupted party, abort
the execution at any moment, and modify the local output that is returned to the application
context;
3. state-controlling: can compute the messages to be exchanged with the other party arbitrarily, but
can only use the secure device in accordance to its interface (as prescribed by the protocol);
4. active: can break the tamper-resistance of the secure device, and thus can exert total control over
the corrupted party during the execution of the protocol.
We believe the above classiﬁcation to be reasonable, since it provides a spectrum of “partial” insider
attacks, progressively bridging the gap between outsider and insider adversaries. Besides, in Section 5,
we prove that output-privacy is attainable against state-controlling adversaries, which are much more
powerful than eavesdropping adversaries, thus tightening the gap between possible and impossible in
the context of private-output multi-party computation.
As a ﬁnal note, we remark that in the following we will focus on static adversaries only. Thus,
we assume that the adversary is initialized with the identity of the controlled party, some auxiliary
information (such as the security parameter `) and her own randomness rA.
3.2 The Real Model: Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition 2. A two-party protocol Π is a pair of strategies (Π1,Π2), where each strategy Πi con-
sists of two Turing machines: the driver Di and the secure device SDi. Intuitively, the secure device
contains a tamper-resistant memory storing data that must be kept secret in order to protect the global
output. The driver Di, instead, is an interactive Turing machine which communicates with the other
party’s driver, while at the same time querying the associated secure device SDi to perform com-
putations involving the protected data stored within SDi. The interaction between the driver Di and
the secure device SDi takes place via a ﬁxed set of queries (called the interface of SDi) which is
determined by the speciﬁcation of the secure device itself.
It is up to the protocol designer to make sure that the driver can accomplish its task with as little
help from the secure device as possible: in particular, the secure device required for our completeness
result (cf. Section 5 and Appendix E) only needs to be able to perform a handful of basic crypto-
graphic operations, which could be implemented on low-power smart-cards. We stress that such basic
set of operations should be the same for many functionalities, i.e., a given implementation of the se-
cure device should not be speciﬁc to a given functionality. In other words, once the design criteria
of the secure device are speciﬁed, these criteria should allow any protocol, respecting those criteria,
to compute any desired functionality, using the same secure device. In Appendix C we describe an
illustrative example of such an implementation, that it is indeed sufﬁcient for our completeness theo-
rem. There, the randomness that has to be kept stored in the secure device is just a secret key (for a
corresponding public-key cryptosystem). Moreover, our proposed secure device is required to be able
to perform only a couple of very simple operations. See Appendix C for further details.
Deﬁnition 3. An (honest) execution of a two-party protocol begins with the two parties P1 and P2
receiving their inputs from the application context, and proceeds as an alternation of P1- and P2-
rounds. In a Pi-round, driver Di computes the next message to be sent to the other party based on
its input, its randomness, the messages received so far from party P3−i, and the interaction with the
secure device SDi. In the last round, each driver Di submits a Finalize-query to the associated secure
device SDi. In response, SDi returns a “dummy” value to Di to acknowledge its query, and writes
the global output on its own (tamper-resistant) global output tape. At this point, driver Di produces
the local output. Notice, once again, that the driver never gets to see the value of the global output.
We now introduce a few random variables related to the execution of a private-output two-party
protocol. To this end, the key aspect to consider is the randomness used by each party. The whole
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i (used
within the driver Di), and the protected randomness rP
i (used within the secure device SDi), which
intuitively represents the piece of randomness that must be protected in order to prevent the adversary
from recovering the global output:
ri
. = (rD
i ,rP
i ), for i = 1,2.
ThepartialviewofPi isarandomvariable3 consistingoftheprivateinputxi,thedriverrandomness
rP
i , the incoming messages mI
j and the answers a` that the secure device SDi provides to the queries
of the driver Di:
VIEW
Π,D
i (x1,x2) . = (xi,rD
i ,mI
1,...,mI
t,a1,...,as), for i = 1,2.
(The rationale for including the answers to the driver’s queries in the partial view is that they may
inﬂuence the outgoing messages produced by Di.)
The local output of Pi, produced by the driver Di at the end of the computation, is denoted with
OUTPUT
Π,L
i (x1,x2) and it is implicit in Pi’s partial view.
The complete view of Pi is a random variable consisting of the private input xi, the full randomness
ri, and all the incoming messages mI
j generated by P3−i:
VIEW
Π,C
i (x1,x2) . = (xi,ri,mI
1,...,mI
t), for i = 1,2.
Notice that it is not necessary to include the responses provided by the secure device SDi in the
complete view, since these are already determined by the protected randomness rP
i (which is part of
ri). Thus, the complete view encompasses more information than the corresponding partial view; it is
also clear that the latter can be easily derived from the former.
The global output of Pi, denoted OUTPUT
Π,G
i (x1,x2), is the value output by the secure device SDi
at the end of the protocol (upon the driver’s call to the Finalize-query); it is implicit in Pi’s complete
view.
Intuitively, at the end of a run of Π, the global outputs of the two parties should agree. We model
this by introducing a random variable OUTPUTΠ,G(x1,x2), deﬁned as follows:
OUTPUTΠ,G(x1,x2) . =
(
OUTPUT
Π,G
1 (x1,x2) if OUTPUT
Π,G
1 (x1,x2) = OUTPUT
Π,G
2 (x1,x2)
⊥ otherwise
where ⊥ is a special “failure” symbol.
We also denote with OUTPUTΠ(x1,x2) the tuple:
(OUTPUTΠ,G(x1,x2), OUTPUT
Π,L
1 (x1,x2), OUTPUT
Π,L
2 (x1,x2)).
Deﬁnition 4. We say that a two-party protocol Π implements a private-output two-party functionality
f if, for any inputs x1, x2 for the two parties, (honest) execution of Π results in the two secure devices
outputting the same global output, and the distribution of the tuple consisting of such global output,
followed by the local outputs produced by D1 and D2 is (computationally) indistinguishable from the
distribution of the functionality f on input x1, x2; or, in formula:
{f(x1,x2)}x1,x2
c
≡{OUTPUTΠ(x1,x2)}x1,x2
where
c
≡ denotes computational indistinguishability by PPT distinguishers.
3 All the random variables we deﬁne are over the probability space induced by the random coins of the two
parties.
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on the execution of a two-party protocol. For short, we will use X ∈ {EAVE, I/O, STATE, ACT} (stand-
ing for “eavesdropping,” “input-/output-controlling, communication-halting,” “state-controlling,” and
“active,” respectively) to denote the type of adversary.
A real-model adversary A (of any kind X) is initialized with an auxiliary input z (which includes
the security parameter `) and some random coins rA. Additionally, different types of adversaries
obtain different information about the execution of the protocol (possibly in an interactive and adap-
tive way). In the following, we model this by introducing random variables X VIEWΠ
A(z),1(x1,x2)
and X VIEWΠ
A(z),2(x1,x2) that an adversary of type X contributes to deﬁne. Then, A gets to see
X VIEWΠ
A(z),ı(x1,x2), for the index ı corresponding to the party controlled4 by A. Following a com-
mon practice for standard two-party computation [28], in the transcript of the protocol we replace
the local output of the controlled party with the adversary’s output. Also, w.l.o.g. we assume A’s
output to consist of all the information that A sees during a protocol’s execution, namely z, rA and
X VIEWΠ
A(z),ı(x1,x2).
Eavesdropping adversaries do not affect the execution of the protocol in any way. The view of a
eavesdropping adversary consists just of the messages exchanged between the two parties:
EAVE VIEWΠ
A(z),ı(x1,x2) . = (mI
1,...,mI
t,mO
1 ,...,mO
t ).
where mI
j and mO
j denotes respectively incoming and outgoing messages received by and sent from
party Pı.
In the presence of the other kind of adversaries, the view of both parties’ maintains the same format
as in the honest case:
X VIEWΠ
A(z),i(x1,x2) . = (xi,rD
i ,mI
1,...,mI
t,a1,...,as), for i = 1,2
where X ∈ {I/O, STATE, ACT}. However, the way in which such views are computed differs substan-
tially from the honest execution, in ways that we now describe.
In the case of an I/O-adversary, the execution begins with A seeing the input xı and the randomness
rD
ı for the controlled party’s driver Dı. Then, A gets to decide (based on z, rA, xı and rD
ı ) the
value ˆ xı that Dı should use in the protocol: we denote this with the notation ˆ xı
. = A(ı, z, rA, xı,
rD
ı ). Similarly, during the execution, A gets to see all the information sent to/from the driver of the
controlled party Pı and can additionally stop the driver Dı at any moment, effectively causing the
protocol to abort. To denote this, for any (j,`)-preﬁx (mI
1,...,mI
j,a1,...,a`) of messages (from
D3−ı) and answers (from SDı), we let A(ı, z, rA, xı, rD
ı , mI
1,...,mI
j, a1,...,a`) denote a YES/NO-
value indicating whether A decides to abort execution at the (j,`)-preﬁx or not. At the end of the
execution, A obtains the local output from Dı, and outputs her entire view. Notice that A does not
obtain the global output from the secure device SDı; however, A can prevent SDı from producing
a global output altogether by stopping the Finalize-query that the driver Dı issues to the SDı at the
end of all its computation.
In the case of a state-controlling adversary A (controlling party Pı), A gets to play the role of the
driver Dı. Thus, A obtains the input xı, and all Pı-round are carried out according to A’s (rather than
Dı’s) code. We remark that A can also interact with the secure device, querying it on arbitrary values,
but such interaction still has to occur using the interface provided by SDı. As for the notation, for a
STATE-adversary A, we use A(ı, z, rA, xı, rD
ı , mI
1,...,mI
j, a1,...,a`) to denote the next message
that A wishes to send to P3−ı (or the next query to be asked to SDı, whichever is appropriate).
In the case of an active adversary, all computations occur as for the state-controlling adversary,
except that now A can additionally play the role of the secure device SDı (as well as the driver’s of
party Pı), so that now the global output is exposed to A. Notation remains as in the STATE case, except
that there is no secure device to query.
4 Although a EAVE-adversary does not actually control any party, for notational convenience we assume that one
of the parties (e.g., party P1) is controlled in a “null” way.
93.3 The Ideal Model
We now provide deﬁnitions of private-output two-party ideal process and of ideal-model adversaries.
By analogy to the real model (cf. Section 3.1), each party Pi in the ideal model is a pair of “dummy”
Turing machines: a driver Di and a secure device SDi. The driver has access to the security parameter
` and is attached to two tapes: the input tape and the local output tape. The secure device can write to
the global output tape, and it exports a Finalize-query (that the driver may or may not call during the
ideal execution).
As in [7], the ideal process is parameterized by the functionality f that the parties wish to evaluate.
Recall (cf. Section 2) that a two-party functionality, in the private-output setting, is deﬁned as f :
N × ({0,1}∗)2 × {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ × ({0,1}∗)2. In the ideal model we assume the existence of an
incorruptible probabilistic trusted third party T , which knows f and `.
An ideal-process adversary B is an interactive PPT Turing machine which may inﬂuence the be-
havior of the controlled party in several ways. Since we are considering the static case, B is initialized
with the identity of the controlled party (if any), some random input rB, along with an auxiliary input
(which includes the security parameter `).
In what follows, we describe the execution of the ideal process assuming the presence of an input-
/output-controlling,communication-haltingadversarycontrollingoneofthe twoparty.Note,however,
that the deﬁnition remains the same in the case of state-controlling adversaries—being in the ideal
model, there is no communication between the drivers that could be altered by such adversaries.
Furthermore, this deﬁnition also applies to the active scenario: in particular, an ideal active adversary
is not conceded access to the secure device since, in the ideal model, the tamper-resistance of the
secure device ought to be ideal i.e., unbreakable. In the case of eavesdropping adversary, instead, none
of the parties is ever controlled by the adversary. Thus, the following deﬁnition applies to adversaries
of any type X ∈ {EAVE, I/O, STATE, ACT}.
Input Stage
Inputs to the parties: Each party obtains an input xi. The controlled party communicates its input
to the adversary. Recall that the parties do not have random input in the ideal model.
Inputs to the trusted party: An honest party always sends xi to the trusted party T . A controlled
party may, depending on the adversary’s strategy (which is based on x¯ ı, as well as on the auxiliary
input and her randomness), either abort or send some b x¯ ı ∈ {0,1}|x¯ ı| to T .
Actual Computation
T provides the local output to the ﬁrst party: T evaluates the functionality on the received inputs
(and fresh randomness, in case f is a probabilistic functionality), and sends the ﬁrst local output
to the ﬁrst party’s driver. If T received only one input, then it sends ⊥ to both parties’ drivers and
secure devices.
T provides the local output to the second party: If the ﬁrst party is controlled, it hands off its local
output (just obtained from T ) to the adversary. Then B may, depending on all the information
received so far, decide to “stop” the trusted party. In this case, T sends ⊥ to the second party’s
driver and to both parties’ secure devices. Otherwise, T sends the second local output to the
second party’s driver.
T provides the global output to the ﬁrst party: If the second party is controlled, it hands off its
localoutput(justobtainedfromT )totheadversary.ThenB may,dependingonalltheinformation
received so far, decide to “stop” the trusted party. In this case, T sends ⊥ to both parties’ secure
devices. Otherwise, T sends the global output to the ﬁrst party’s secure device.
T provides the global output to the second party: If the ﬁrst party is controlled, the adversary
may, depending on all the information received so far,5 decide to “stop” the trusted party. In this
case, T sends ⊥ to the second party’s secure device. Otherwise, T sends the global output to the
second party’s secure device.
5 Note that the information available to the adversary at this point is the same as that available in the second
step of the Actual Computation stage, since the global output is stored in the secure device and is therefore
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Local output: An honest party’s driver always writes the local output received from the trusted
party to its local output tape. A controlled party’s driver may write an arbitrary value to its local
output tape, depending on the strategy of the adversary.
Global output: An honest party’s driver always invokes the Finalize-query on the secure device,
which causes it to write (on its global output tape) whatever value received from T . A controlled
party’s driver may or may not invoke the Finalize-query on the corresponding secure device. If
such query is not invoked, we assume that the global output tape of this party contains ⊥ (as an
initial default value). If the Finalize-query is invoked, the secure device of the controlled party
writes the global output received from T to its global output tape.
Ideal-Model Adversaries. The ideal-model adversary affecting the execution of the ideal process as
described above can be captured by the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 5 (Ideal-Model Adversary). An ideal-model adversary is a PPT Turing machine B such
that, if ı is the index of the controlled party, xı is the corresponding input, and z and rB are B’s
auxiliary input and random coins, then:
– B(ı,z,rB,xı) outputs an altered input ˆ xı ∈ {0,1}|xı| for Pı;
– B(ı,z,rB,xı,yı) outputs (ˆ yı,bhalt,bﬁn) ∈ {0,1}∗×{EARLY, LATE, NEVER}×{YES, NO}, where:
1. ˆ yı is the altered output for party Pı;
2. bhalt denotes B’s decision on aborting the execution (EARLY = abort right after getting yı;
LATE = abort after SDı gets y0; NEVER = do not abort);
3. bﬁn speciﬁes whether or not B wishes to allow SDı to output y0.
3.4 The Security Deﬁnition
Let f : N × ({0,1}∗)2 × {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ × ({0,1}∗)2 be a two-party functionality and Π be a
private-output two-party protocol implementing f. Let X ∈ {EAVE, I/O, STATE, ACT}, and let A be a
real-model adversary of type X, and B be an ideal-model adversary.
Deﬁnition 6. The joint real-model execution of Π under A controlling party Pı on input pair (x1,x2)
and auxiliary input z, is deﬁned as:
X REALΠ
A(ı,z)(x1,x2) . = ((OUTPUT
Π,G
1 (x1,x2),Γ1),(OUTPUT
Π,G
2 (x1,x2),Γ2))
where we have Γı
. = (z,rA, X VIEW
Π,L
ı (x1,x2)), Γ3−ı
. = OUTPUT
Π,L
3−ı(x1,x2), and the random
variables X VIEW
Π,L
1 (x1,x2), X VIEW
Π,L
2 (x1,x2), OUTPUT
Π,G
1 (x1,x2), OUTPUT
Π,G
2 (x1,x2), and
OUTPUT
Π,L
3−ı(x1, x2) refer to the same execution of Π in the presence of A(z) controlling party Pı,
and are computed as described in Section 3.2.
Deﬁnition 7. The joint real-model execution of Π under A is deﬁned as the ensemble:
X REALΠ
A
. = {X REALΠ
A(ı,z)(x1,x2)}x1,x2,ı,z
Deﬁnition 8. The joint ideal-model execution of f under B controlling party Pı on input pair (x1,x2)
and auxiliary input z, is deﬁned as:
IDEAL
f
B(ı,z)(x1,x2) . = ((y1
0, ˆ y1),(y2
0, ˆ y2))
where:
ˆ xı
r ← B(ı,z,rB,xı), ˆ x3−ı ← x3−ı, (y0,y1,y2)
r ← f(ˆ x1, ˆ x2), (ˆ yı,bhalt,bﬁn)
r ← B(ı,z,rB,xı,yı),
ˆ y3−ı ←
(
⊥ if ı = 1 ∧ bﬁn = EARLY
y3−ı otherwise
yı
0 ←
(
⊥ if bﬁn = NO
y0 otherwise
y
3−ı
0 ←
(
⊥ if bhalt 6= NEVER
y0 otherwise
not revealed to the adversary. We prefer to split the strategy of the adversary in two steps only for clarity of
exposition.
11Deﬁnition 9. The joint ideal-model execution of f under B is deﬁned as the ensemble:
IDEAL
f
B
. = {IDEAL
f
B(ı,z)(x1,x2)}x1,x2,ı,z
Deﬁnition 10. Protocol Π is said to output-privately compute f with respect to X-adversaries (where
X is one of {EAVE, I/O, STATE, ACT}) if Π implements f (in the sense of Deﬁnition 4), and for every
PPT real-model adversary A of type X, there exists a PPT ideal-model adversary B, such that:
IDEAL
f
B
c
≡ X REALΠ
A.
3.5 Further Comments
It is quite easy to see that our deﬁnition can be viewed as a generalization of that by Canetti [7].
Such comparison is discussed in appendix B. Also the extension to n-party functionalities is quite
straightforward.
4 Impossibility Result
In this section, we formally state the impossibility result brieﬂy discussed in Section 3. This is interest-
ing because it shows that our deﬁnition formally captures the intuition that private-output multiparty
computation should be impossible when facing active adversaries.
The following theorem (whose proof is included in Appendix D) is given for the two-party case,
but it can be easily generalized to the multi-party case.
Theorem 11. Let f be any 1-non-trivial two-party function (with respect to some distribution D) and
π be any two-party protocol that computes f. Then there exists an active adversary A (controlling one
player) such that, for any ideal process active adversary B, the two distribution ensembles IDEAL
f
B
and ACT REALπ
A are not computationally indistinguishable, that is, there cannot exist any π that can
output-privately compute f in the presence of A.
5 A Completeness Theorem for State-Controlling Adversaries
Given the impossibility result for active adversaries (cf. Section 4), in this section we focus on the
problem of realizing secure private-output two-party computation in the presence of state-controlling
adversaries. In particular, we show that if enhanced trapdoor permutations [29,28] exist, then any
functionality f can be privately computed in the presence of computationally bounded state-control-
ling adversaries.
Theorem 12. Let ` be a security parameter. If enhanced trapdoor permutations exist, then for any
private-output two-party functionality f, there exists a protocol π output-privately implementing f
with respect to STATE-adversaries.
An overview of the resulting construction and proof are included in Appendix E. For the sake of
modularity, we prove the theorem for the case of I/O-adversaries (and then we use standard techniques
to extend the proof to the case of STATE-adversaries). In a nutshell our proof goes as follows. As a
ﬁrst step we describe an adequate hybrid model. Next we show that this model can be used to reduce
the problem to that of realizing deterministic functionalities. Finally, we exhibit a construction for any
deterministic function seen as an arithmetic circuit.
Here we note that as an interesting by-product we get a (sequential) composition theorem (Theo-
rem 15) for the framework of private-output two-party computation. See Appendix E for full details.
Theorem 13 (informal). Assume a protocol Πg output-privately computes a functionality g, and
a protocol Πf|g output-privately computes f using ideal calls to g. Then the composed protocol
Πf . = Πf|g ◦ Πg output-privately computes f in the real model.
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A Formal Deﬁnition of Non-Triviality
In Section 2, we informally introduced the notion of t-non-triviality for global-output multi-party
functionalities as requiring that no adversary controlling up to t of the inputs, and seeing the corre-
sponding local outputs, can completely determine the global output, when the honest parties’ inputs
are sampled according to a given distribution.
More precisely, let D be the distribution according to which players’ inputs are assumed to be
sampled (notice that this allows the inputs to be arbitrarily correlated). Let A = (A1,A2) be a proba-
bilistic, polynomially bounded, two-stage adversary controlling up to t players. In the following A is
allowed to access the private inputs and the local outputs of t players. For simplicity, and without loss
of generality, we will assume that A controls players P1,...,Pt.
Deﬁnition 14 (Non-triviality). Let D be a samplable distribution. We say that a global-output multi-
party function f is t-non-trivial with respect to D, if no PPT adversary A can predict the global
output of the function with probability negligibly close to 1, when the inputs of the players are chosen
according to D. More formally, we require that for any A and sufﬁciently large `,
Pr


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
y0 = y0
0









(x1,...,xn)
D ← {0,1}`;ρ
r ← {0,1}`1;
(ˆ x1,..., ˆ xt, STATE)
r ← A1(`,x1,...,xt);
(y0,y1,...,yn) ← f(`, ˆ x1,..., ˆ xt,xt+1,...,xn,ρ);
y0
0
r ← A2(STATE,y1,...,yt)





≤ 1 − µ(`)
where `1 is a parameter polynomially related to `, µ(·) is a non-negligible function, and the probability
is over the random coin tosses of A, the random choice of ρ in {0,1}l1 and the random choice of the
inputs according to D.
We emphasize that the notion of non-triviality is deeply different from that of t-private functions
as deﬁned by Kushilevitz et al. [15,1], in which the adversary, when seeing up to t inputs, as well
as the output, tries to get additional information about the other inputs. Our notion is instead related
to the notion of unpredictable function, as deﬁned by Lindell et al. in [13]. Since our setting deals
with global-output multi-party functionality, the notion of non-triviality needs to take into account
the distinction of global and local outputs, and is consequently more stringent. Indeed, a t-non-trivial
function is required to be unpredictable with respect to a distribution (rather than just to some speciﬁc
inputs). Moreover, in our context the adversary should not be able to predict the global output y0, even
if she is given access to the local outputs y1,...,yt of the controlled parties.
Remark. Note that we refer to non-triviality as a property of a function with respect to a distribution.
Intuitively, this is because efﬁciently computable multi-party functions may not be non-trivial with
respect to all (efﬁciently samplable) distributions (e.g., consider a deterministic functionality and an
input distribution that, conditioned on any ﬁxed values for the ﬁrst t inputs x1, ..., xt, assigns the
entire marginal probability mass to a single tuple for xt+1, ..., xn).
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B.1 Extension to n-Party Functionalities, n > 2
The deﬁnition given in Section 3 for the two-party setting can be easily generalized to the multi-
party case. For the case of eavesdropping adversaries the deﬁnition of secure private-output multi-
party computation is pretty much the same as in the two-party case. Following [28], we consider two
different scenarios to model general adversarial behaviors. The ﬁrst model is very similar to the two-
party case: the adversary is permitted to control even a majority of the participants and early abortion
is allowed. In the second model the adversary is only allowed to corrupt a strict minority of the players
and early abortion can actually be prevented.
B.2 Comparison with Canetti’s Deﬁnition
We now brieﬂy discuss the relation between our approach and the one by Canetti [7], and argue that
our deﬁnition actually generalizes the one presented in [7] for the setting of standard multi-party
computation secure against static adversaries.
Let us brieﬂy recall the ideal process as described in [7]. The input-substitution phase is basically
identical to ours: the ideal process adversary sees (and possibly alters) the inputs of the corrupted
parties. In the computation stage the parties hand the inputs to T . The latter performs the required
computation (i.e., T evaluates the f on the given inputs) and sends back to each player the corre-
sponding output value yi. The output phase goes exactly as our local output phase, whereas no global
output is deﬁned in [7].
In our model, on the other hand, after terminating the actual computation stage, the trusted party T
ﬁrst hands to each player Pi his local output yi, and then (in the global output stage) hands to each Pi
the (common) value y0. Now, if we set y0 = ⊥, our deﬁnition becomes identical to the one proposed
by Canetti. In particular, the separation of each party’s strategy in two components (the driver and
the secure device) becomes immaterial—when there is no global output y0, there is no information
requiring the additional security provided by the secure device, which is thus unnecessary. For the
same reason, in such case the deﬁnitions of real-model state-controlling and active adversary coincide,
and the impossibility result of Section 4 no longer applies (since a functionality whose global output
is always ⊥ cannot be non-trivial in the sense of Deﬁnition 14).
Our deﬁnition, however, is more general, because it allows to consider more general scenarios such
as those where no local data is sent to the players (i.e., yi = ⊥) or those where an “hybrid” solution is
required (i.e. where both y0 and yi are different from ⊥).
C Informal Description of the Secure Devices’ Capabilities
In this section, we informally describe a simple interface for the secure devices that is actually sufﬁ-
cient to prove our completeness theorem.
We assume that each secure device comes with a public key pk (for a corresponding encryption
scheme) which is certiﬁed by an adequate authority and that is made available, together with its
certiﬁcate, by the driver that uses it. The corresponding secret key sk is the only secret that the secure
device is required to store.
The driver communicates with the secure device through the following set of queries. Let M be the
message space for the public-key cryptosystem used by the secure device. For simplicity, we assume
that M is the same for all the parties participating to the protocol (i.e., drivers and secure devices).
Decrypt&Combine: This query has the following syntax. It takes an input of the form (n,,(C1,
...,Cn),a), where:
–  is an associative operator (typically ⊕, + or ·);
– n is an integer such that if n 6= 0, (C1,..,Cn) is a vector of ciphertexts, produced using the
secure device’s public key, of messages m1,..,mn ∈ M;
– k is an integer; and
15– a is an element of M.
The secure device, upon receiving such a query proceeds as follows.
– If n > 0, it decrypts the received ciphertexts and combines them all with a using the 
operator.
– If n = 0, the result is simply a.
Let y0 be the obtained result: the secure device sends a dummy value to the driver to acknowledge
its query and stops.
Finalize: Whenever the secure device receives a Finalize-query from driver D, it returns to D a
pointer p and writes the global output y0 (if this is deﬁned) on its own (tamper resistant) output
tape. The pointer p is interpreted as follows. It is used by the driver to have implicit access to the
global output. More precisely, the driver cannot use the pointer to actually access (i.e. see) the
global output. Rather it uses p to be able to perform future operations using y0 (for example if y0
has to be used as input for future protocols).
If a Finalize-query is asked after several Decrypt&Combine-queries, the secure device simply
writes on its output tape all the global outputs computed so far, and sends several pointers to the
driver.
D Proof of Theorem 11
To prove the theorem we show an active, polynomially bounded, real-model adversary A such that
for any active, polynomially bounded, ideal-process adversary B, the produced distributions are ef-
ﬁciently distinguishable. Let π be any two-party protocol for computing f. At the beginning of the
protocol, A obtains the input of the corrupted player (without loss of generality we can assume that
P1 is the corrupted player). Next A merely monitors the internal memory of P1 during the entire exe-
cution of the protocol. When the output y0 of f is available, A reads it and, at the end of the process,
she outputs y0 together with all the informations gathered during the execution of π. Notice that since
we are assuming that f is computed by π, the output of the honest player will be (or at least it will
contain) y0.
Let IA be the set of active, ideal adversaries whose running time is polynomially related to the
running time of A. Notice that the crucial difference between A and any adversary B ∈ IA, is that
A can access the input, the local output and the global output of the corrupted player, while B can
see only the input x1 and the local output y1 (which are assumed not to disclose y0 due to the 1-non-
triviality of f). This implies that B cannot “guess” y0 with probability higher than 1 − µ(`) for some
non-negligible quantity µ(`) (` is the usual security parameter).
Therefore we can construct a polynomial time distinguisher ∆ for the two distribution ensembles
ACT REALπ
A and IDEAL
f
B as follows. ∆ receives on input a challenge sampled according to either
the IDEAL
f
B distribution ensemble or the ACT REALπ
A one (depending on some secret bit b). Then ∆
simply checks whether the output of the adversary equals that of the honest player or not. If this is the
case, it outputs 1 (as its guess for the real process), otherwise it outputs 0.
Let us analyze the probability of success of ∆. We deﬁne the advantage “Real/Ideal” of ∆ as
follows
Adv
RI(∆) = |Pr[∆ → 1|b = 1] − Pr[∆ → 1|b = 0]|.
Our goal is to prove that this quantity is non negligible. Clearly, one has that Pr[∆ → 1|b = 1] = 1.
On the other hand if the challenge comes from an ideal execution of the protocol, then any ideal
adversary B can produce a distribution which is indistinguishable from the real one only if it “guesses”
y0 correctly. Thus
Adv
RI(∆) = 1 − Pr[∆ → 1|b = 0] = 1 − Pr[B(x1,y1) → y0] > µ(`),
where the last inequality comes from the 1-non-triviality of the functionality f. This concludes the
proof. u t
16E Proof of Theorem 12
The construction of a secure protocol for an output-private two-party functionality f is based on the
same technical tools as for the case of standard two-party computation. In particular, below we present
the outline of the proof of a variant of Theorem 12 for the case of I/O-adversaries; its extension to
the case of STATE-adversaries relies on the use of authentication, commitments and zero-knowledge
proofs in a way that is essentially identical to the compilation of private two-party protocols into
secure ones. We defer the details to a full version of this paper.
E.1 The Hybrid Model
In this section, we describe the so-called “hybrid model” we are going to use in our proof. The mo-
tivation for the model, however, is more general; speciﬁcally, the goal is to enable composition of
cryptographic protocols with output privacy, following the modular approach as described by [7] for
designing such protocols. The hybrid model we are about to deﬁne is very similar to that used in
standard multi-party computation, so we just recall the main lines here. For more technical details, we
refer the reader to [7].
Let g be a private-output two-party functionality. A protocol for the g-hybrid model is deﬁned as
in Deﬁnition 2, augmented with a mechanism for “g-oracle calls”. Such oracle is available to both
parties, and must be called with two inputs, one from each party; the result of the oracle call is a pair
of local outputs (one for each party’s driver), along with a global output to be delivered to both parties’
secure devices. In particular, each party’s driver has an additional read/write oracle-tape, while secure
devices have an extra read-only oracle-tape. Oracle calls are performed as follows:
1. The invoking party’s driver (for instance, D1) writes its input x
g
1 for the g-functionality on the
oracle tape, and then sends a special message oracle request to the other driver (to notify that an
oracle invocation has been initiated).
2. In response, the other driver writes on its own oracle tape its input x
g
2 to the g-functionality, and
answers with another special oracle call message.
3. Both drivers inform the associated secure device that an oracle call is occurring. This again, is
modeled with a special query to the secure devices.
4. At this point, the oracle is invoked (intuitively, the functionality g is evaluated on input (x
g
1,x
g
2)),
and the local outputs y
g
1 and y
g
2 are written on the oracle tapes of the call initiator and responder,
respectively. Additionally, the global output of the functionality y
g
0 is written on the oracle tapes
of both secure devices.
5. Finally, each secure device SDi returns to the driver Di a special handle, or pointer to the global
output y
g
0. We stress that such pointer does not allow Di to read the value of y
g
0, but is needed to
enable Di to make future references to such value in subsequent interactions with SDi.
The notions of protocol execution and output-private views w.r.t. X-adversaries (X ∈ {EAVE, I/O,
STATE, ACT}), as deﬁned in Section 3, can be directly extended to the g-hybrid model to deﬁned
the output-private security of the protocol in the hybrid model; we omit the details for conciseness.
Additionally, one can deﬁne a notion of output-private reduction: a protocol Πf|g output-privately
reduces f to g w.r.t. X-adversaries, if Πf|g output-privately computes f (w.r.t. X-adversaries) in the
g-hybrid model.
E.2 Composition of Protocols under I/O-adversaries.
In this paragraph we show that the standard notion of protocol composition still applies in our setting.
Let Πg be a protocol implementing g, and Πf|g be a protocol implementing f in the g-hybrid
world. The composed protocol Πf . = Πf|g ◦ Πg is obtained from Πf|g, by replacing invocations
of the g functionality in Πf|g with real-world executions of Πg. Notice that both Πf|g and Πg are
pairs, consisting of a driver and a secure device; thus, Πf will also be a pair, whose driver Df may
ask queries (namely, Decrypt&Combine and Finalize) to the secure device SDf.
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Fig.1. The hybrid model
By a standard argument, it is possible to prove that when the two components are secure w.r.t. I/O-
adversaries, the composed protocol Πf is also secure w.r.t. the same class of adversaries, thus leading
to the following result:
Theorem 15 (Composition Theorem — I/O-adversaries). Given a protocol Πf|g output-privately
reducing f to g (w.r.t. I/O-adversaries), and a protocol Πg output-privately computing g (w.r.t. I/O-
adversaries), the composed protocol Πf . = Πf|g ◦ Πg output-privately computes f (w.r.t. I/O-
adversaries).
Proof (Sketch). Given the security of Πf|g and Πg, there exist simulators Sf|g and Sg. Proving the
theorem amounts to exhibit a simulator Sf for Πf. Such simulator is built by composing the existing
simulators.
1. First Sf|g is run to obtain a simulated execution of Πf|g in the g-hybrid world (it is easy to see
that Sf can feed its own input to Sf|g in this phase); during the execution Sf|g has to make a
polynomial number of oracle calls to the sub-protocol g;
2. Then Sg is used to ﬁll in the “gaps” left by the simulation created in the previous step. In other
words, for each invocation of the g-functionality occurring in the simulated transcript, the simu-
lator Sg is invoked on the corresponding input/output values to obtain a suitable transcript for the
sub-protocol Πg.
Now we show that such simulator Sf produces a transcript which is computationally indistinguish-
able from one resulting from a real execution of Πf with the same inputs and outputs. This is done
using a standard hybrid argument: let N be the number of (sequential) invocations of the g that occur
in Πf|g. Then, one goes through a sequence of N + 1 hybrids experiments:
1. the ﬁrst experiment produces the transcript according to the simulator Sf;
182. the second experiment consists in ﬁrst running Πf|g and then simulating g-calls using Sg (indis-
tiguishability from the previous experiment follows by the security of Πf|g);
3. subsequent hybrids replace, one after the other, simulated executions produced by Sg with real
execution of Πg (indistinguishability follows from the security of Πg).
The composition theorem follows from the observation that the last experiment in the sequence of
hybrids is the real protocol. u t
E.3 Deterministic vs. probabilistic functionalities
We now show how the computation with private output for general (probabilistic) functionalities can
be reduced to that of deterministic functionalities [28, p.638].
Since a probabilistic functionality with inputs xand y, using randomnessr can be viewed as a deter-
ministic functionality of (x,y,r), we can construct the deterministic counter part of any functionality
f by adequately sharing the randomness between the two parties.
This mechanism allow us to focus on the problem of realizing deterministic functionalities. More
formally, a randomized functionality f(x1,x2;r) (where r denotes the randomness) can be reduced
to its deterministic counterpart ¯ f:
¯ f((x1,r1),(x2,r2)) . = f(x1,x2;r1 ⊕ r2)
where r1,r2 are chosen uniformly at random by Party 1 and Party 2, respectively.
It is easy to see that we can now consider an hybrid model in order to compute any functionality.
Indeed, the reduction from the general case to the deterministic case basically consists of the realizing
the following protocol Πf| ¯ f for the ¯ f-hybrid world: given his input xi, each party Pi randomly selects
a value ri, and simply invokes the ¯ f-functionality on input (xi,ri). The probabilistic functionality f
is then inherently computed. For this reason, we now have to concentrate on protocol realizing Π
¯ f.
E.4 Construction for Deterministic Functionalities.
We now describe a construction of output-private secure (w.r.t. I/O-adversaries) protocols Πf for any
deterministic functionality f. Following the approach of [28], we think of f as an arithmetic circuit,
thus consisting of a sequence of additions and multiplications in a given ﬁnite ﬁeld.
The general way of going is to evaluate the circuit gate by gate in a distributed fashion. This is
nothing but the historical result of [29]. For the addition gates, the operation is trivial and requires
no interaction between the players. While for the multiplication gates, one needs interaction and the
security relies on the Oblivious Transfer (OT) primitive; it is a well-known result that OT exists if
(enhanced) trapdoor permutations exist.
Deﬁnition 16 (Enhanced trapdoor permutations). A indexed family of functions is said to be en-
hanced trapdoor if it is a trapdoor permutation family, and additionally, the one-wayness property
still holds for a random element in the domain, even if the coins used to sample this element are made
public.
Intuitively speaking, it is clear that the rationale in [29] can be viewed as a special case of private
output computation, where the secure devices are not used and the global output is always ⊥.
In the rest of this section, we then address the following points:
1. How to share the inputs between the parties;
2. How to evaluate securely the arithmetic circuit for f, in a distributed manner;
3. How to reconstruct the outputs.
19Description of the Protocol. In the ﬁrst phase, each party’s driver Di splits its own input xi into two
shares x1
i,x2
i, with xi = x1
i + x2
i. Then, D1 sends x2
1 to D2 and D2 sends x1
2 to D1. The two drivers
proceed by evaluating the circuit gate by gate.
Then we turn to evaluating the arithmetic circuit. Addition gates are easy to take care of, since
shares of the sum can be non-interactively obtained from the addends. As for multiplication gates, it
is possible to use essentially the same oblivious-transfer-based protocol, originally proposed by [29].
The only difference is that, in our setting, at the end of the protocol, the two secure devices will
contain ⊥ as global output. In other word, we use the same paradigm using a (slightly) modiﬁed OT-
protocol, in which both drivers and secure devices get an output, however the output for secure devices
is always set to ⊥ (i.e., the SDs are not used in practice). Clearly, this minor modiﬁcation does not
affect the security properties of the original construction, which thus securely reduces evaluation of
multiplication gates to (modiﬁed) oblivious transfer. Similarly, since the (classical) oblivious transfer
functionality does not have a global output, standard two-party protocols for oblivious transfer can be
straightforwardly translated to the private-output setting in order to implement this modiﬁed version
of OT.
Finally, it remains to discuss how the two parties reconstruct the global output y0 and the local
outputs y1,y2, once all gates of the circuit have been evaluated. This phase involves the secure devices
as follows. First note that at the end of the evaluation phase, each party holds three shares: yi
0,yi
1,yi
2
for the global output and the two local outputs, respectively. Also we recall that each secure device
SDi has a public key PKi (certiﬁed via a PKI); the public key is made available by the party.
The reconstruction phase proceeds by having driver D1 sending y1
2 and the certiﬁed PK1 to D2,
and vice versa. At this point, each Di computes its local output by recombining the shares y1
i and y2
i
into yi = y1
i + y2
i . Next, D1 sends the value y1
0, encrypted under PK2, while D2 sends the value
y2
0, encrypted under PK1. Being encrypted, such values are not intelligible by the drivers. Thus, each
driver Di invokes his secure device to use the received encryption, say Ci, along with the share yi
0,
through a query Decrypt&Combine(Ci,yi
0,+). A Finalize-query then give (handle) access to the
global output y0 for future needs.
Security Analysis. Given the security of the basic building blocks (i.e., Oblivious Transfer, which re-
lies on the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations), to get a proof of security it remains to prove
that the overall construction is secure in the OT-hybrid model, namely that there exists a simulator
that can produce a transcript indistinguishable from that of the real execution, given oracle access to
the OT-functionality.
To this end, we need to simulate the view of the adversary, which includes (1) the messages ex-
changed between the drivers during the gate-by-gate evaluation of the circuit, (2) the messages ex-
changed to recombine the shares of the local and global outputs, and (3) the communication between
the driver of the controlled party and the corresponding secure device.
Messages of type (1) can be simulated as in [29], essentially proceeding backwards from the local
outputs, deriving known shares while choosing at random the shares of unknown quantities.
Messagesoftype(2)and(3)consistjustofpublicinformationandciphertexts,thatcanbesimulated
by encrypting a ﬁxed message, assuming semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme. u t
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